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Piotr Żochowski, Marta Jaroszewicz
Systemic corruption has been the dominant problem of an independent Ukraine for more 
than two decades. The takeover of the state by a political-business group led by Viktor Yanu-
kovych had been one of the principal causes for large-scale street protests during the Revo-
lution of Dignity. Following the 2014 power shift, slogans calling for combating corruption 
and cleaning up the elites have featured among the most important priorities announced by 
President Petro Poroshenko and two consecutive prime ministers – Arseniy Yatsenyuk and 
Volodymyr Groysman. Moreover, the fight against corruption remains the West’s main condi-
tion to support Ukraine. 
It is difficult to make an unambiguous assessment of the achievements of the past three years. 
The frequently expressed view that the anti-corruption reform has failed cannot be accept-
ed. Complex socio-political processes should not be measured in the short-term perspective. 
In a legal and institutional sense, much more has been done in the field of combating corrup-
tion than over the whole period of Ukraine’s independence. On the other hand, the actual re-
sults of anti-corruption activities are few in number. The Ukrainian leadership has lost its initial 
zeal for reform and the parliamentary majority frequently adopts legislation that hampers the 
fight against corruption. Resistance of a major portion of the political elite and of various inter-
est groups has been increasingly evident. They fear that the anti-corruption reform will disable 
them from doing business according to former methods. The principal success involves the 
establishment of two independent institutions: the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine 
(NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAP). This is accompanied by the 
systemic involvement of civil society in the fight against corruption. In both 2015 and 2016, 
drastically low number of court rulings regarding corruption-related crimes did not increase. 
However, in recent months, for the first time in history, several prominent politicians and offi-
cials have been arrested. This has triggered serious concern in influential political and business 
groups which, in response, have stepped up their efforts to fight independent anti-corruption 
institutions. Ukraine has neared a critical moment when the first high-ranking officials may be 
convicted of crimes. However, this is a very uneven fight since it is being waged only by those 
employees of the anti-corruption institutions, who are ready to break the ‘old ties’ with sup-
port from the international community and non-governmental organisations.
The level of corruption 
and the first serious investigations
There are various levels of corruption: low-level 
corruption (related to the everyday life of citi-
zens), corruption at the middle level of govern-
ment, and large-scale political corruption. As far 
as the latter is concerned, two phenomena are 
typical of contemporary Ukraine: politicians’ de-
pendence on big business, and the sponsoring 
of political parties by oligarchic groups. It can-
not be objectively stated whether corruption 
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at the middle level of government and large-
scale corruption have decreased after the col-
lapse of the Yanukovych regime. The reason be-
hind this is the lack of instruments to measure 
the phenomenon. The most credible method 
involves comparing relevant statistics com-
piled by public order institutions and courts 
over many years. However, in Ukraine, where 
the judiciary is inefficient, this makes no sense. 
The popular Transparency International rank-
ing offers a subjective view on corruption, i.e. 
how society perceives it. Ukraine is ranked very 
low on these lists (in 2014 it was ranked 142nd, 
in 2015 – 133rd and in 2016 – 131st out of 176 
countries surveyed), which indicates that cor-
ruption remains a paramount social problem.
Due to the high level of corruption involving 
close ties between politics and business, the ac-
tual and systemic involvement of the prosecu-
tion bodies and the judiciary in the fight against 
corruption is of fundamental importance for 
Ukraine. After years of stagnation, the first pos-
itive changes are being felt. In recent months, 
NABU brought serious corruption charges 
against two active politicians:Roman Nasirov, 
head of the State Fiscal Service and member of 
the Petro Poroshenko Bloc was accused of un-
lawful restructuring of tax arrears, which caused 
major losses for the state treasury1. Mykola Mar-
tynenko, a prominent activist of the People’s 
Front party was accused of illegally transferring 
funds from state-controlled mining companies2.
1 For more see T. Iwański, ‘Nasirov arrested – a blow 
against corruption in Ukraine’, OSW Analyses, 8 March 
2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2017-03-08/nasirov-arrested-a-blow-against-cor-
ruption-ukraine 
2 Interfax Ukraina, Суд перенес на 12 мая рассмотрение 
апелляции прокуратуры на отказ в аресте 
Мартыненко, 5 May 2017. 
It is difficult to assess how grave the evidence 
gathered by NABU and SAP is or how long the 
judicial proceedings will take since the case is 
multilayered and requires comprehensive inter-
national assistance. In contrast to earlier inves-
tigations by NABU, the two cases involve rather 
large sums – in the so-called ‘Martynenko case’ 
the allegedly stolen sum stands at US$ 17 mil-
lion, and in the ‘Nasirov case’ it was around US$ 
75 million3. NABU has also requested the public 
prosecutor’s office strip three MPs of their im-
munity. These MPs, Oles Dovgiy, Maksim Pol-
yakov and Boryslav Rozenblat, are suspected 
of bribing other MPs when adopting laws on 
amber mining4. Two important investigations 
are still to be closed. Despite the efforts made 
by anti-corruption bodies, the court refused to 
strip Mykola Zlochevsky, the former ecology 
minister, of the gas extraction licences which 
he had acquired in an illegal manner5. The SAP 
has also failed to collect evidence that would 
enable it to formulate an indictment against 
Mikhail Okhendovsky, head of the Central 
Electoral Committee, suspected of accepting 
a bribe from the so-called ‘black accounts’ kept 
by the Party of Regions6. 
The National Anti-Corruption Bureau 
It was possible to launch investigations target-
ing high-ranking officials due to the fact that 
two new independent institutions – the an-
ti-corruption bureau and the anti-corruption 
prosecutor’s office – were finally established 
at the end of 2015. The process of establish-
ing these institutions took longer than had ini-
tially been planned. The reluctance on the part 
of other law enforcement institutions, system 
inertia, poor organisation, and budgetary and 
personnel problems all delayed the reform. 
The major cause for the delay was pushback 
from representatives of the political elite and 
3 Ibid. 
4 http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2017/06/20/7147434/ 
5 http://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2017/06/16/626102/
6 https://dt.ua/UKRAINE/sap-pripinila-rozsliduvann-
ya-u-spravi-proti-ohendovskogo-245012_.html
The Ukrainian leadership has lost its ini-
tial zeal for reform and the parliamentary 
majority frequently adopts legislation that 
hampers the fight against corruption.
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various interest groups uninterested in boost-
ing the independence and the investigative 
potential of these institutions. This resistance 
is difficult to analyse precisely. Specific parlia-
mentary caucuses, groups of MPs or even in-
dividual MPs have repeatedly attempted to 
adopt legislation to limit NABU’s mandate, for 
example by introducing the principle that NABU 
would not be allowed to launch an investiga-
tion into a case which the public prosecutor’s 
office has dismissed or closed. Interestingly, 
these attempts are not being made by MPs 
from a single caucus, but by MPs representing 
both the Opposition Bloc (which is the succes-
sor of Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions) 
and the ruling parties: the Petro Poroshenko 
Bloc and People’s Front. Amendments to the 
law on operation and reconnaissance actions, 
intended to make NABU independent from 
other state security bodies, are being blocked 
in parliament. The procedure of selecting the 
members of NABU’s audit committee (which, in 
line with the adopted legislation, has been au-
thorised to assess NABU’s activities and request 
the president to retain or dismiss the bureau’s 
head) has become fully politicised7.
The results of NABU’s activities to date (that is, 
to April 2017) include 319 launched investiga-
tions, 178 notifications on suspicion of commit-
ting a crime, 91 indictments prepared on the 
basis of materials compiled by the bureau. The 
anti-corruption prosecutor’s office submitted 
57 cases to the courts. According to statistics 
compiled by NABU, the suspects are: central 
and local administration officials (25%), man-
agers of state-controlled companies (23%), 
7 h t t p : / / w w w . p r a v d a . c o m . u a / a r t i -
cles/2017/03/17/7138444/ 
judges (14%), high-ranking state officials (9%). 
Aside from the cases that happened after the 
Revolution of Dignity, the proceedings also 
cover corruption-related crimes committed un-
der Yanukovych (they include, for example, the 
prosecution of individuals involved in the prac-
tice of bribing politicians representing specific 
political parties and those involved in corrup-
tion related to parliamentary election fraud). 
To April 2017, NABU had submitted requests to 
the Ukrainian courts to seize funds amounting 
to 2 billion hryvnias (around 70 million euros)8.
The great unknowns and the failures
• The public prosecutor’s office
Since Yuri Lutsenko, former head of the presi-
dential party’s parliamentary caucus, was ap-
pointed Attorney General, the public prosecu-
tor’s office has been involved in an increasingly 
heated dispute with NABU over the division of 
competences. Regardless of the planned reduc-
tion of the influence the prosecutor’s office has 
on how NABU proceeds with its investigations 
and of the fact that the State Investigative Bu-
reau is currently being established, the present 
Attorney General claims that NABU “should not 
be monopolising the fight against corruption”. 
He argues that the public prosecutor’s office 
should remain the main investigative body in 
this field. In August 2016, the investigations 
carried out by these two institutions against 
each other culminated in a psychical fight be-
tween the respective officers, which resulted in 
them being detained for a short time9. In May 
2017, the public prosecutor’s office launched 
an investigation targeting Gizo Uglava, depu-
ty head of NABU, a native of Georgia. He was 
charged with holding dual citizenship when 
taking his post at NABU, among other offenc-
es. NABU rejects these charges and views them 
8 http://news.liga.net/interview/politics/14737953artem_
sytnik_v_dele_martynenko_nabu_uverenno_idet_k_re-
zultatu.htm
9 For more see P. Żochowski, R. Sadowski, Korupcyjny 
węzeł gordyjski na Ukrainie, Analizy OSW, 24 August 
2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/ana-
lizy/2016-08-24/korupcyjny-wezel-gordyjski-na-ukrainie 
Representatives of the political elite and 
various interest groups are not interest-
ed in boosting the independence and the 
investigative potential of anti-corruption 
institutions.
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as an attempt to discredit Uglava in connection 
with his actions in the Martynenko case10. 
According to Lutsenko, in 2016 the public pros-
ecutor’s office submitted more corruption-re-
lated cases to the courts than all the authorised 
bodies11. However, the efficiency of the public 
prosecutor’s office in combating corruption 
should be assessed as low. Due to the fact that 
neither the courts nor the public prosecutor’s 
office regularly publish information on the 
number of opened and closed anti-corruption 
cases, it is necessary to refer to estimates by 
independent investigative journalists. Accord-
ing to the Nashi Groshi website, in 2016 nearly 
8,000 corruption-related cases were opened. 
They resulted in a mere 362 individuals receiv-
ing final sentences, including five individuals 
who received prison sentences. In around 40 
cases, prison sentences were handed down, 
albeit not final. It should be noted that the in-
vestigations carried out by the public prosecu-
tor’s office concerned minor corruption-related 
crimes and in more serious cases lenient sen-
tences were pronounced12.
After two years of delay, the public prosecu-
tor’s office began to investigate cases involv-
ing the so-called ‘large-scale corruption’ from 
the Yanukovych era. So far, the investigations 
have not been particularly successful – none of 
Yanukovych’s aides was taken to court over cor-
ruption charges. Several major investigations 
were dismissed due to insufficient evidence or 
because they had fallen under the statute of 
limitations. As a consequence, the European 
Union and Interpol have removed the names of 
10 http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2017/05/24/7144889/
11 http://korrespondent.net /ukraine/3760938-lutsen-
ko-o-borbe-s-korruptsyei-obschestvo-ne-oschuschaet
12 http://nashigroshi.org/2017/02/23/habari-2016-koho-
posadyly-i-za-scho/ 
the individuals involved from the list of people 
covered by sanctions or the list of wanted in-
dividuals. In late February 2017, Ukraine’s Su-
preme Court dismissed the case against Yuri 
Ivanyushchenko, one of Yanukovych’s closest 
business partners who is considered by society 
to be a symbol of the corrupt practices of those 
years. The reason behind this dismissal was the 
lengthy prosecution process13. The final seizure 
of US$ 1.4 billion belonging to Yanukovych, 
frozen on accounts in Oschadbank since 2014, 
carried out by a court in late April 2017, should 
be viewed as a success14. What is astonishing, 
though, is the legal basis for this seizure and 
the pace at which it was implemented (it took 
a mere two weeks). 
Assets declarations
Ukraine’s system of combating corruption is 
also beset by negligence in introducing mech-
anisms for preventing corruption, promot-
ing ethical behaviour and preventing corrup-
tion-prone practices (including conflicts of 
interests). The systemic gathering, verification 
and public disclosure of the assets declarations 
of state and local government officials (more 
than one million individuals) was intended to 
facilitate these activities. The National Agency 
for the Prevention of Corruption was the insti-
tution responsible for gathering and verifying 
these declarations. The deadline for submit-
ting the first portion of the declarations by the 
highest-ranking officials had been repeatedly 
postponed but was passed in October 2016. 
There were endless technical problems with 
the system accepting the declarations. Parlia-
mentarians repeatedly attempted to change 
the regulations in force and limit the number of 
categories of individuals obliged to submit their 
declarations. Finally, in the first round 103,000 
13 For more see material by the Anti-Corruption Cen-
tre (ANTAC): https://antac.org.ua/publications/
cherez-znyattya-sanktsij-es-z-poplichnyka-yanukovy-
cha-yury-enakijevskoho-ukrajina-vtratyl  
14 Турчинов объяснил, почему деньги Януковича 
возвращали через суд, Ukrainska Pravda, 28 April 2016. 
Ukraine’s system of combating corruption is 
beset by negligence in introducing mecha-
nisms for preventing corruption.
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electronic declarations were submitted and 
the total value of assets they covered stood at 
around US$ 1 billion, the lion’s share of which 
belonged to the president, members of par-
liament and members of the government15. 
The impressive sums stated in the declarations 
do not necessarily signify corruption. However, 
they clearly indicate that most Ukrainian politi-
cians and state officials come from business cir-
cles. This, in turn, requires the Ukrainian state to 
apply strict legal and ethical standards to elimi-
nate the risk of conflict of interest when adopt-
ing regulations pertaining to the economy.
The deadline in the second round of submit-
ting e-declarations, this time covering middle- 
and low-level officials, passed on 1 April 2017. 
Again there were frequent technical failures 
which disabled the process of submitting the 
declarations. This time, however, it was not the 
content of the declarations that attracted the 
public’s attention but the fact that, as a result 
of competence disputes and the poor efficiency 
of its work, the National Agency for the Pre-
vention of Corruption was unable to launch 
the automatic declaration verification system. 
As a consequence, the agency opened the veri-
fication procedure for only 100 declarations out 
of the 1.1 million which were submitted. More-
over, the agency’s conflicted executives are un-
able to agree on the further course for checking 
the declarations. Prime minister Groysman even 
called on the agency’s executives to resign16. 
15 17 кроків до прозорості: хто заважав, а хто допомагав 
запровадити е-декларування в Україні Хто і як 
заважав електронному декларуванню?, Vox Ukraine, 
2 November 2016, https://voxukraine.org/2016/11/02/17-
steps-for-transperency/
16 Корчак спростовує звинувачення у блокуванні 
перевірки декларацій , Ukrainska Pravda, 11 May 2017, 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2017/05/11/7143612/. 
The judiciary
The small number of sentences in cases involv-
ing corruption charges has been the chief prob-
lem which Ukraine has been unable to resolve. 
Moreover, the courts frequently decide to re-
lease corruption suspects from custody, they 
reduce the required amounts of bail, and the 
court proceedings are very lengthy. According 
to data compiled by the Anti-Corruption Cen-
tre ANTAC in November 2016, out of 33 cas-
es which NABU submitted to common courts 
in 2015–2016 a mere six have been opened; in 
the remaining 27 cases the court has not even 
set the date of the first hearing17. This trend il-
lustrates the judges’ reluctance to adjudicate 
in corruption-related cases, especially when the 
suspects are high-ranking officials.
In September 2016, constitutional amend-
ments came into effect regarding the reform 
of the judiciary, alongside the law on the judi-
ciary and on the status of judges. These new 
provisions change the rules of choosing and 
appointing judges, and introduce a number of 
anti-corruption instruments. The changes have 
also increased the independence of judges and 
strengthened the powers of the main bodies of 
the judges’ self-governing . The changes have 
impacted the process of eliminating corrupt 
judges only to a certain extent18. This means 
that in the worst case scenario the judiciary will 
not be rid of individuals who are dependent on 
political ties or those who have had corruption 
charges brought against them, and the fact 
that the judges are practically impossible to re-
move from their posts will prevent a personnel 
change and preserve the former mentality. 
In this situation, civil society, supported by the 
international community, has voiced the need 
17 Why Ukraine needs anti-corruption courts?, Anticorrup-
tion Centre (ANTAC), November 2016, https://antac.org.
ua/en/publications/why-ukraine-needs-anti-corruption-
courts
18 The changes mainly covered the bodies of the judges’ 
self-governing council and judges directly involved in 
trying the participants of Euromaidan. Around 1,000 
judges resigned from their posts voluntarily, most prob-
ably in connection with the requirement to submit open 
assets declarations. 
The courts frequently decide to release 
corruption suspects from custody, they 
reduce the required amounts of bail, and 
the court proceedings are very lengthy.
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to establish a special anti-corruption court of 
first instance with a very strict procedure of 
recruiting judges, increased guarantees of in-
dependence from external factors, and securi-
ty guarantees for judges adjudicating in these 
courts. A special anti-corruption chamber at 
the Supreme Court could serve as the second 
instance19. Theoretically, the new law on the ju-
diciary and on the status of judges provides for 
such a solution; however, in practice both the 
Ukrainian leadership and the judges’ communi-
ty are not favourably inclined towards this pro-
posal20. In May 2017, the Judiciary Committee 
of the Verkhovna Rada stated that according to 
the latest constitutional amendments the bill on 
establishing the anti-corruption court may be 
submitted to parliament only by the president. 
The promoters of changes
Civil society’s contribution to building the new 
anti-corruption system is enormous. Represent-
atives of social organisations were able to set 
the tone of the public debate regarding corrup-
tion. Numerous institutional and legal propos-
als regarding, for example, the anti-corruption 
court or the introduction of an open system 
of publishing assets declarations have been 
inspired by this group21. Media and non-gov-
ernmental activists are also involved in direct 
actions intended to put pressure on public in-
stitutions. For example, a rally was organised 
by social activists in front of the courthouse in 
which the judges debated whether to place Ro-
man Nasirov, the head of the State Fiscal Ser-
vice, under arrest; this was done in order to 
prevent him from leaving the building. In other 
19 For more see Why Ukraine needs..., op. cit.; M. Zher-
nakov, Independent Anti-corruption Courts in Ukraine: 
the Missing Link in Anti-Corruption Chain, Internation-
al Renaissance Foundation Policy Brief, February 2017, 
http://rpr.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Renais-
sance_A4_3ANTI-CORRUPTION-COURTS-.pdf 
20 Ibid. 
21 S. Kudelia, Corruption in Ukraine: Perpetuum Mo-
bile or Endplay of Post-Soviet elites, [in]: H.E. Hale, 
R. W. Orttung (eds.), Beyond the Euromaidan. Comparative 
Perspectives on Advancing Reforms in Ukraine, Stanford 
University Press 2016. p. 63; T. de Waal, Fighting the cul-
ture of corruption in Ukraine, Carnegie Europe, April 2016. 
countries this type of pressure on the judiciary 
would most probably be considered unaccept-
able. In Ukraine, though, it was welcomed. 
Actions of this type are treated as the only way 
to prevent the decisions by judges who yield 
to political pressure or by corrupt judges, who 
allow suspects to flee abroad.
The international community is another source 
of pressure on the Ukrainian leadership. This in-
cludes: the European Union, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the USA, and the gov-
ernments of specific EU states. Anti-corruption 
requirements are among the most important 
conditions of loans and macroeconomic assis-
tance offered to Ukraine. The visa liberalisation 
plan Ukraine implemented in late 2015 was an-
other instrument to facilitate the changes. 
In total, Ukraine has received aid from the EU 
worth EUR 2.8 billion22. In February 2017, the EU 
launched a special assistance project intended 
to support the implementation of an anti-cor-
ruption system in Ukraine23. To date, the IMF 
has paid out four loan instalments to Ukraine 
(totalling US$ 8.4 billion) out of US$ 17.5 billion 
agreed in March 2015. In its March 2017 mem-
orandum regarding the payment of the most 
recent instalment, the IMF pointed to delays in 
the implementation of anti-corruption obliga-
tions. In reaction to this, Ukraine committed it-
self to appointing an audit committee at NABU 
by the end of June 2017. NABU was expected to 
have been granted the right to freely use wire-
22 EU Commission approves disbursement of €600 million 
in assistance to Ukraine, European Commission Press 
Release, 16 March 2017.
23 The EU and Denmark launch Euro 16 million EU Anti- 
Corruption Initiative in Ukraine, External Action Service 
Press Release, 1 February 2017, https: /eeas.europa.eu/ 
19719/eu-and-denmark-launch-euro-16-million-eu-anti-
corruption-initiative-ukraine_en
Anti-corruption requirements are among 
the most important conditions of loans 
and macroeconomic assistance offered 
to Ukraine.
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tapping equipment in its actions24 by the end of 
May 2017, and by mid-June 2017 the Verkhovna 
Rada was expected to have adopted a law on 
anti-corruption courts which should begin their 
work at the end of March 2018 at the latest25. 
So far, neither of these tasks has been fulfilled. 
The future of the fight against 
corruption in Ukraine
Ukraine has been recording increasing legisla-
tive delays in adopting anti-corruption laws. 
Parliamentarians are in no hurry to adopt a law 
expanding NABU’s operating competences. 
The cases opened against the former head of 
the State Fiscal Service and a People’s Front ac-
tivist, alongside the most recent political cor-
ruption charges brought against several MPs, 
have resulted in increased political attacks on 
the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and accu-
sations involving its alleged abuse of powers.
The National Agency for the Prevention of Cor-
ruption has been in an organisational deadlock; 
several members of its collective executive body 
resigned from their posts in protest against ir-
regularities. In comparison with the previous 
year, the involvement of President Poroshenko 
and his administration in supporting the an-
ti-corruption reform has diminished. Poroshen-
ko announced that he would not abandon the 
24 The former deadline, end of November 2016, has not 
been kept by Ukraine. 
25 Ukraine. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Polic-
es. Attachment to the letter of intent sent to the Manag-
ing Director of the IMF on March 2, 2017. 
introduced changes regarding the requirement 
for non-governmental activists to submit open 
assets declarations. Despite the fact that the 
legislative initiative regarding the establish-
ment of anti-corruption courts is in his hands, 
he failed to submit a request to parliament for 
a quick adoption of the relevant law. Corrup-
tion-related accusations are being formulated 
towards politicians from the Petro Poroshen-
ko Bloc politicians with greater frequency and 
this has placed the president in a difficult situ-
ation. On the one hand, against the backdrop 
of a dwindling approval rating, he should take 
a tough stance and support the fight against 
corruption. On the other hand, strict measures 
to combat corruption may weaken the consoli-
dation of his party. 
The fight against corruption in Ukraine is en-
tering a new phase. For the first time in his-
tory anti-corruption investigations have been 
launched against active politicians and the 
public has been granted access to information 
about the assets owned by high-ranking offi-
cials. NABU and SAP are improving their opera-
tional and investigational skills and may soon be 
ready to carry out investigations into the most 
serious corruption cases. The establishment of 
anti-corruption courts will be of fundamental 
importance because these courts will be able 
not only to open proceedings, but also to ex-
amine the cases in an independent, substantive 
and non-lengthy manner. The stakes are very 
high and therefore further serious attacks on 
anti-corruption institutions in the immediate 
future are likely.
